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CoNsnTUTIONAL LAw-EXEcuTIVE PowERs-RIGHT TO REMOVE EXECUEMPLOYEES WITHOUT JUDICIAL TRIAL-Plaintiff was reinstated in the
classified civil service of the federal government on the condition that removal
might be ordered if, "on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief
that the [plaintiff] is disloyal to the Government of the United States."1 Such
evidence having allegedly been uncovered, dismissal followed, with a ban
against federal employment for three years. The specific grounds for suspicion
were never revealed to plaintiff, and no opportunity was ever afforded to confront, cross-examine, or learn the identity of those who had informed against
her. Plaintiff sought an order of reinstatement in the federal district court,
contending that the method of dismissal failed to follow prescribed procedure2
and unconstitutionally punished her without judicial trial. Summary judgment
was entered for the government. The court of appeals reversed in part and
affirmed in part, holding that, although the three year ban was invalid because
it inflicted punishment without judicial trial, the dismissal procedure was
proper. 3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed, without opinion,
by an evenly divided court Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669
(1951).4
Unless validly limited by Congress, 5 the executive department has full power
over the removal of its inferior officials,6 which includes the power to prescribe
removal procedure. Thus, assuming that it is in accord with the governing
statute and executive order, the dismissal procedure used in the principal case
is clearly proper, unless there is a constitutional limitation restricting the kind
of procedure which may be prescribed. It might be argued that such a limitation could be grounded upon the First Amendment, since there will be an
unavoidable restraint on speech if the standard of dismissal is mere suspicion
of disloyalty. However, once the general power to remove is conceded, providing that it is not used as a subterfuge to violate the amendment, free speech
could be held. immaterial. ''Petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 7 A more likely
TIVE

1

5 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1949 ed.) (civil service regulation).
5 U.S.C. (1946) § 652; and 3 C.F.R. 132 (Supp. 1947), which is the President's
loyalty order. See 46 Ml:cH. L. REv. 942 (1948).
3 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. See 26 NoTRB DAMB
LAWYER 142 (1950); 99 Umv. PA. L. REv. 98 (1950); 36 VA. L. REv. 675 (1950).
4 See 27 N.D. L. REv. 341 (1951).
5 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 6 S.Ct. 449 (1886), upheld the power of
Congress to regulate removals ordered by department heads in whom Congress, under Art.
II, §2, had vested the power to appoint. How far Congress may regulate has not been
finally decided.
6 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535 (1903). Power to appoint
includes power to remove: Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 230 (1839); Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869 (1935). Federal employees have
no property rights in their jobs: Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 20 S.Ct.
890 and 1009 (1900); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890).
7 Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 at 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892). Also, Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964 at 966.
2
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approach8 is a balancing of the conB.icting individual and public interests,9
which, in view of the seriousness of the present world conB.ict and judicial
respect for executive discretion in handling its own affairs, should lead the
Court to give the greater weight to the public interest in loyal employees.10
In any event, the test of clear and present danger is not available, being confined to cases where the government's objective is to curtail speech for its own
sake.11 If removal or its consequences inB.ict punishment, the removal procedure is in effect a criminal trial, and the procedural guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment will apply. Removal alone is not punishment, although removal
plus proscription on further government employment has been so held.12 Something more is needed to invoke the amendment, and it is doubtful whether the
loss of reputation and narrowed opportunity for re-employment, which attend
dismissal, can supply it. Although a court might conceivably consider this an
extreme case justifying its stretching the amendment,13 it would have to overcome the real difficulty of saying that mere incidental and unintentional inB.iction of hurt is genuinely analogous to inB.iction of punishment.14 Thus,
neither the First nor the Sixth Amendment provides any sound basis for limitation on the executive power of removal. As the recent dismissal cases agree,
the federal employee has no right to the "pomp and circumstance" of a formal
judicial trial.15 It is enough if his removal satisfies the congressional standard
of promoting the "efficiency and integrity" of the federal service. 16
William E. Beringer

8 The likely answer to Justice Holmes is the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
accepted by the Court, over his dissent, in Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct.
190 (1910). Petitioner may not have a constitutional right to be a policeman, but he may
have the right not to be discharged because he talks politics.
9 For this test under the commerce power, compare American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 399, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
10 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 96, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
11 American Communications Association v. Douds, supra note 9, at 396.
12 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), which stresses
the factor of proscription. Although the case involved a bill of attainder and not the Sixth
Amendment, it is a good precedent because both limitations apply only if there is punishment.
13 Dissent, Bailey v. Richardson, supra note 3, at 66 and 69.
14 Justice Frankfurter, concurring, United States y. Lovett, supra note 12, at 324;
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 at 379-380 (1866).
15 Washington v. Clark, supra note 7, at 967. Also, Friedman v. Schwellenbach
(D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22; Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct'.
909 (1951); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 10.
16 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 97 and 100. See 5 U.S.C.
(1946) §652.

